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Article 10

STICKING POINTS
Sean Dyde
The Writing of Spirit: Soul, System,
and the Roots of Language Science
by Sarah M. Pourciau. New York:
Fordham University Press, 2017.
Pp. 373. $25.00 paper.

Something combines the squiggles
you currently see, the sounds you
hear as you read them, and the
meanings that bubble up for your
comprehension. This is the foundation of language, and of linguistics as the science of language. But
ask what of language is being connected, and we push hard against
commonplaces in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, art, and history writing, just to name a few. Go
deeper still, ask what is doing the
combining, and we fumble towards
an understanding of our culture
and other societies, or perhaps
towards nature, or something inarticulable at the heart of language.
Amidst this darkness, we find the
ideas that drive linguistics itself.
Pourciau’s The Writing of Spirit is
not a history of linguistics, as such,
but rather a history of the idea, or
perhaps an intuition, that the ways
we express ourselves reflect some
hidden order.
A hard enough task, but a task
made harder by starting with early
nineteenth-century Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling’s Weltseele.
The world-soul demanded that science capture not only its objects of
knowledge but also their surroundings, how our dappled reality emerges
from a cosmic whole. By understanding the origins and inner drive
of the world as it unfurls throughout history, we may be able to gain
some hint to its—and our—ultimate purpose: in my beginning is
my end. The Weltseele gave impetus

Criticism Fall 2018, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 569–572. ISSN 0011-1589. doi: 10.13110/criticism.60.4.0569
© 2019 by Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan 48201-1309

569

570

Sean Dyde

to many studies of language, most
famously to Jakob Grimm’s “sound
laws,” the historic shifting of consonants in manuscripts: at once a call
for a pure Germanic tongue, a testament to the inner balance of language, and a search for the origins
of Reason itself. Words connect
Logos and Psyche.
Less familiar to English-speaking
audiences is just how far languageas-spirit permeated nineteenthcentury thought. Pourciau gives
two examples. The first surrounds
Sanskrit hymns, Latin verses and,
in particular, the German word
Stab. The term can mean letter or
stick, and as a poetic device indicates
alliteration and emphasis. Yet, for
nineteenth-century etymologists, it
meant much more: an origin scene
of Germanic tribes, witnessed by
Tacitus, removing twigs from trees
and caving runes on them. Then
cast into the air for the priest to read
aloud the message that Odin had
impelled within. From this scene—
Language, Nature, and Divinity
tied into One—came the origins of
the German alphabet and the fundamental shape of German verse,
emphasis and meaning spread
throughout. Pourciau’s second
example of spirit-language is even
more grandiose. In a series of essays
published between 1849 and 1852,
Richard Wagner transformed theories of a primal German poetry into
operatic art. Music and poetry follow their separate laws and paths of
organic development, he believed,

but when coming together as equals
give emotional intensity and a sense
of living movement. Vowels held
this key. Carrier of sound and time,
vowels for Wagner were at once
music, breath, and life. Audiences
were to identify with the eternal
cycles of the cosmos and find in his
The Ring of Nibelung their oldest
origin story, a goal for humanity.
These examples achieve an argumentative force by translating the
heady pronouncements of idealist philosophy into more concrete,
indeed picturesque, forms. They
animate Pourciau’s discussions,
drawing connections between
the arts, humanities, and sciences
that few scholars have attempted
before. They are a rich reward for
the author’s attention to detail.
Naturally, others did not wish
to return to the forests from which
we came. These include mechanistmaterialist August Schleicher and
Neogrammarians Karl Brugman
and Hermann Osthoff. But chief
opponents of the Sprachgeist for
Pourciau are late nineteenth-century
Swiss semiotician Ferdinand de
Saussure and early twentiethcentury Russian-American literary
theorist Roman Jakobson. Pourciau
makes good use of the manuscripts
discovered in 1996 to explain
Saussure’s turn away from the
bright light of the Infinite. When
faced with the written and spoken
word in all their variety, Saussure
reasoned, either we the recipients
have endless stores of knowledge

ON THE WRITING OF SPIRIT
for comprehension or that sense is
limited by what we cannot communicate. The radical conclusion is
that meaning itself is meaningless,
given by the boundaries of what
we see, hear, or think, rather than
by any inner import. No private
idioms, no original Logos, no life
within words. The study of language must study only language.
Relatedly, with his anagram studies, Saussure tried to analyze the
German alphabet at a stage prior to
meaning. The attempt failed, but
it inspired Jakobson’s phonological method, dividing spoken words
into “minimal pairs” identifying
phonemes, then breaking even
these down again into qualities
of diction. All, that is, except the
Icelandic h and the French silent e.
These, with no discernible quality, the “zero phoneme,” illustrated
for language both its foundational
emptiness and the conditions of
its possibility. Teleology and spirit
once more, but contained entirely
within language itself.
The historical crux of The
Writing of Spirit is that the devil is
in the detail. Indeed, the devil is in
this review as well: I have discussed
its contents chronologically rather
than thematically, as Pourciau
does in the text. Balancing chronological and thematic analysis is
always difficult; the risk is that
one stands in the way of the other.
Sometimes the effects are minor.
One example is Saussure’s wave
metaphor, with which Pourciau
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illustrates his notion of signification (80–82) but which is later
revealed to be a central image for
Germanic philosophical thinking
through Leibniz, Kant, Wagner,
Helmholtz, and Wundt (166–169).
Sometimes the effects are more dramatic. Pourciau’s is an avowedly
internalist history, showing that
twentieth-century language scientists have never completely eradicated the spirit that animated their
nineteenth-century predecessors.
So there is some justification for
dividing the book into a history of
general linguistics, then a history
of poetic analysis, and then a
history of phonology. These allow
for discussions of very fine theoretical detail. But technicalities alone
leave major questions and themes
unexplored, and, in fact, invite in
another type of spirit we should
cast out: that Science, like romantic
conceptions of Language, unfurls
through history according a logic
of its own. Both Swiss Saussure and
Jewish Jakobson had reasons for
resisting the German Geist. Yet aside
from the mention of Jakobson’s first
flight to Copenhagen in 1939, no
more is made of this devilish detail.
A related point is the relationship between language science
and the other sciences. Pourciau
rightly poses this as the central—
indeed, perennial—dilemma for
linguistics: what elements of language can be studied scientifically.
The issue entirely depends on
what counts as science. Pourciau
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explains to great effect the high
conceptual and methodological
position of comparative anatomy in
romantische Naturphilosophie, and
Wundt’s psycho-physical parallelism is a useful foil to Jakobson’s
phonology. But more could be made
of Schleicher’s Darwinist propensities (60–61); of common themes in
Saussure’s radical methodology,
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology,
and Émile Durkheim’s sociology,
mentioned in a single sentence
(70); as well as the anxious affinity
that Neogrammarians felt with late
nineteenth-century mathematicians
on how to study continua, referred
to here in a footnote (283). How
far linguistics could emulate these
other sciences—through methods,
practices, explanatory tropes, and
metaphysical backgrounds—or else
rail against them, helps legitimize
the science of language.
So there are two spirits here.
One, metaphysical, may imbue a
language; the other animates scientists to engage with language. The
distinction bears upon Pourciau’s
final thoughts, where structuralist linguistics is placed between
empiricist philosophers such as
David Lewis and “neorationalists”
such as Noam Chomsky: between
language as arbitrary convention,
and as neural or genetic substrate.
Here, Pourciau offers languageas-interface, an ongoing event,

created when mind and world
come together, yet subject to its
own laws. Nineteenth-century
spirit embodied in twentiethcentury letters. But this is not borne
out by Pourciau’s thematic analyses, which end with semantics,
etymology, grammatology, and
phonology each on their own separate paths. Not a language science
but many sciences of language. Nor
is the view supported by the fragments into which linguistics has
since broken, as language scientists have pursued their own goals
with their own mirror-images of
natural-scientific methods. This
reflects the professional spirit as
much as the metaphysical. We have
lost the mystical philosophy that
held nineteenth-century language
science together, and for good reasons that include—but are in no
ways limited to—language. But
without a replacement that permeates all levels of analysis, or at least a
framework that hangs all the pieces
together, or even a common course,
all we are left with are squiggles
and sounds.
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